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Deciding how to coordinate activities can be a challenge posed in any 
marketing chain. This case involves an agricultural cooperative that has focused 
entirely on marketing raw sugar cane for additional refinement. Recent dramatic 
shifts in the sector have caused the members of the cooperative to consider 
building a facility that will process the raw sugar cane. In so doing, the 
cooperative can consider using the spot market, using contracts, vertically 
coordinating, or vertically integrating. This case study of Louisiana Sugar Cane 
Products, Inc. is a unique, real-life case that can be widely used in marketing 
and cooperatives courses. 
Introduction 
In his office, surrounded by Louisiana State University Tiger 
paraphernalia, Lonnie Champagne carefully laid out the situation for Mike Daigle, 
president of the board of directors of Louisiana Sugar Cane Products, Inc. 
(LSCPI) cooperative. Mike understood that the changing sugar industry would 
force LSCPI to make some major strategic choices in the near future. As general 
manager of LSCPI, Lonnie had taken it upon himself to identify the options 
available to the members that would position the cooperative for long-term 
success.  
Lonnie Champagne has been a part of sugarcane production in Louisiana 
since he was born, and during his five years as general manager at LSCPI, he has 
seen tremendous change in the sugar marketing value chain. Producer numbers 
had remained relatively stable during that time, but the rest of the industry had 
just completed a phase of tremendous consolidation. According to the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the number of companies involved in 
sugar manufacturing (sugar beet and sugarcane processing and raw sugar refining) 
was cut nearly in half in the 35-year period from 1967 to 2002 (Haley and Ali). 
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mills in Louisiana that process raw sugar began to work together to cooperatively 
market their products by creating LSCPI.   
As industry conditions had given rise to LSCPI in 1975, industry 
conditions now required a strategic choice by LSCPI regarding sugar refining 
(table 1). To date, the members of the cooperative had only been involved in the 
processing of sugarcane into raw sugar. With fewer refineries transforming raw 
sugar into commercially ready product, the members of LSCPI had fewer 
customers. As a result, their bargaining position had mostly eroded. The board 
members of LSCPI realized the need to consider several options to deal with the 
consolidation in the industry. Lonnie and Mike began the process of preparing a 
presentation that would layout the situation for the members of the board of 
directors and give them several options. 
Louisiana Sugar Cane Products, Inc. 
The Louisiana marketing cooperative of LSCPI was founded in 1975 by 
nine sugar cane mills (Champagne). As of 2007, only seven sugarcane mills 
remain as members. Three of these mills are cooperatives owned by sugarcane 
producers, and the other four are privately held mills. These mills use LSCPI 
exclusively to market their annual supply of 800,000 tons of raw sugar, which 
accounts for more than 75 percent of the raw sugar marketed in Louisiana. In 
addition, LSCPI also markets the byproducts of sugarcane processing, specifically 
molasses. The mills represent more than 700 producers of sugarcane in the 
Louisiana bayou. The cooperative has five employees including General Manager 
Lonnie Champagne. The staff handles the marketing of raw sugar and byproducts 
produced by the member mills.  
LSCPI is strictly an agricultural marketing cooperative (Champagne). Its 
primary mission is to market the raw sugar produced by member mills with the 
goal of maximizing the returns to its members. The members of LSCPI are the 
mills, not the sugarcane producers. Unlike most other agricultural commodities, 
the first processor of sugarcane (the mill) is the seller of the commodity (raw 
sugar). LSCPI members (the mills) benefit from both the price paid for raw sugar 
and from the patronage refunds that represent LSCPI’s profits distributed to its 
members in proportion to business volume. Sugarcane producers indirectly 
benefit from LSCPI’s efforts in that the value mills pay producers for sugarcane is 
based directly on the price of raw sugar received by the mill from LSCPI. In 
addition, since some of LSCPI’s member mills are cooperatives, the farmer 
owners of those firms benefit from LSCPI patronage payments which are passed 
through in the form of cash and stock patronage from the cooperative mill. 
The seven mills that comprise the membership of LSCPI also make up its 
board of directors (Champagne). Each mill has one vote on issues brought before 




mills are farmer-owned cooperatives (represented by circles in figure 1), and the 
board of directors would likely take a joint venture or major strategic decision to a 
vote of the membership. Four of the mills are investor-owned corporations 
(represented by squares in figure1), and a joint venture or other strategic decision 
would likely be decided by the board of directors without a stockholder vote. 
As a legal entity, LSCPI essentially owns no assets (Champagne). Office 
space is leased. Raw sugar warehouses are constructed and owned by member 
mills and leased to LSCPI. All monetary benefits to members are passed down to 
the mills first and then by the mills to producers as price received for sugar and 
molasses sales less cooperative marketing expenses. The U.S. sugar market is 
closely controlled by the USDA to balance supply and demand. As a result, raw 
sugar market prices have been relatively flat for many years. Typical prices for 
raw sugar received by LSPCI have been in the 19.5 to 21.5 cent per pound range. 
Prices received for molasses, however, tend to vary greatly from year to year. 
Current molasses prices are in the 45 to 50 cent per gallon range.  
The management and board of LSCPI had doubts about the efficiency of 
price discovery at the NYBOT and therefore did not rely on the spot market 
(Champagne). As a result, much of the raw sugar was recently sold to Imperial 
Sugar Corporation by contract. According to the Imperial Annual Report, LSCPI 
has executed a contract to provide 90 percent of Imperial’s raw sugar needs until 
September 30, 2008. As a result of the large consolidation in the industry, Lonnie 
realized that maintaining the status quo was only viable for a short period of time. 
Using his knowledge garnered from earning an M.S. in agricultural economics, 
Lonnie recognized that it might be time for a change in the way the cooperative 
vertically aligned itself (fgure 2) (Peterson, Wysocki, and Harsh). 
 
The Decision at Hand  
For LSCPI, the future is becoming increasingly uncertain. Fewer refineries 
mean fewer bidders for its products. Passage of free trade agreements have the 
potential of squeezing domestically produced raw sugar out of the refined sugar 
market. The market concentration has forced LSCPI and its mill members to 
reconsider their position in the sugar marketing chain. In a situation such as this, 
one might consider the vertical coordination continuum.  
As leaders of a cooperative business, Lonnie and Board President Mike 
also understand that there are unique issues that they must consider. Lonnie is 
exploring an opportunity to partner with Cargill and its Sweeteners Division to 
construct a sugar refinery as one of many options. Partnering with another entity 
such as Cargill to vertically integrate into raw sugar refining could offer 
advantages in terms of the value of the final product sold. Refined sugar products 
could be sold in various regional markets at differentiated prices to maximize 
returns to the partnership. However, LSCPI would not want to change its Journal of Cooperatives  4 
 
organizational structure. In other words, all benefits received by LSCPI from the 
potential partnership would have to be passed on to member mills and then down 
to sugarcane producers as raw sugar price or patronage refunds distributed in 
proportion to sugar purchases. More intangible benefits of the vertical integration, 
such as the development of retail brands might be under appreciated by LSCPI 
members since, in the short run, this strategy would not impact the price received 
or patronage payments associated with raw sugar and molasses sales. Of 
importance to LSCPI is that their organizational structure and their relationship 
with their cooperative and private LSCPI member mills both remain in their 
current forms. 
Lonnie and Mike need to develop a presentation that would describe the 
options available to the cooperative for vertical coordination and then defend the 
best option. The objectives of this case study are for students to decide where 
LSCPI should locate along the vertical coordination continuum and what factors 
lead the students to believe their choice is the best decision for the cooperative. 
Students should be sure to list the advantages and drawbacks of each option and 
defend the option they view as the one most likely to ensure the long-term 
viability of the cooperative. 
Sweetener Users and Consumers 
As a nation, Americans consume nearly 10.5 million tons of sugar 
annually. Much of the sugar is already in products bought for consumption. 
Products obviously using sugar include candies, confectionaries, cereals, snacks, 
and jellies. But other products such as soft-drinks, liquor, salsa, dairy products, 
and pharmaceuticals benefit from the sweetness of sugar. Americans also 
purchase refined sugars for consumption at home, often for baking or for 
beverages such as coffee. The price of sugar purchased for home consumption has 
remained relatively steady in the recent past, despite declines in the price of 
wholesale refined sugar (figure 3).  
Food processors, each with unique needs, have a large demand for sugar 
(figure 4). For example, United Sugars Corporation offers sugar in 15 different 
forms including variations of granulation and colors and even a liquid form. Sugar 
competes primarily with high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) to sweeten products. 
Subsidies of corn production have lowered prices for this input, which makes it 
competitive with sugar as an input. HFCS is often used to sweeten soft-drinks. 
Also, consumers who are trying to limit their caloric intake might opt for a 
product sweetened by a low-calorie sweetener such as aspartame or sucralose.  
Because consumers have so many options for sweetening foods and 
beverages, the competitive pressures on all members of the sugar marketing chain 
is intense. The sugar marketers’ job is to price and sell sugar products to food 




in prepared, packaged foods. The marketers also sell bags of granulated sugar to 
retailers such as Wal-Mart, Kroger, Publix, and others.  As such, sugar producers 
and processors must offer a quality product at a competitive price to capture a 
share of the consumers’ food dollars.  
The Sugar Marketing Chain 
Several steps are involved in producing, processing, and retailing sugar 
from sugarcane. Five major roles form the value chain. Initially sugarcane 
producers sell to sugarcane mills that produce raw sugar. These mills, in turn, sell 
to sugar refineries where the sugar is further processed into its usable form. The 
refineries offer their product for sale either to food retailers (grocers) or as an 
input to pre-prepared, packaged foods (such as cake mixes, dry cereals, and other 
products.). Finally, retail consumers use the product.  
 
Production  
Sugar is produced all over the world. The New York Board of Trade 
(NYBOT) calls sugar the “Universal Commodity” because it is produced in over 
120 countries and is consumed in every country. The United States Department of 
Agriculture’s (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service estimates marketing year 
2007/2008 world production at about 163 million tons of raw sugar (USDA 
World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates). Production exceeds world 
demand, which was estimated at just over 149 million tons in 2007/08. This 
excess has resulted in growing world stocks of sugar. The largest international 
producer of sugar is Brazil, accounting for just over one-fifth of the world’s sugar 
production. The United States ranks fifth as a sugar-producing country (grouping 
the European Union nations together as one ‘country’) with just over 4.5 percent 
of total world sugar production.  
Sugar can be produced from either sugar beets or sugarcane.  Production is 
spread across the US (http://www.sugaralliance.org/files/docs/sugar_industry_map.pdf). The 
sugar and corn sweetener industries combined generate about $10 billion of direct 
and indirect economic value in the U.S. (American Sugar Alliance). More than 
135,000 jobs rely on the sugar industry in the U.S. Sugar beets account for about 
60 percent of the U.S. annual production of 8.5 million tons, with sugarcane 
accounting for the remaining 40 percent. The U.S. also imports about 3.4 million 
tons of sugar (figure 5), which makes the U.S. the second largest importer of 
sugar in the world. Domestic production of sugarcane has occurred almost 
exclusively in Louisiana and Florida with those two states sharing equally about 
87 percent of U.S. production (figure 6). The remaining production occurs in 
Texas and Hawaii.  
The producers of sugarcane in Louisiana have fewer alternative cropping 
opportunities relative to their peers in Florida, Texas, and Hawaii (Champagne). Journal of Cooperatives  6 
 
Each of these three areas has seen sugarcane producers switch to alternative crops 
that generate greater net returns than sugarcane. For example, sugarcane once was 
produced in California, but many producers there switched to nut-bearing trees, 
all but eliminating sugarcane production in the state. Some producers in Florida 
have switched to strawberries, tomatoes, and other high-value fresh produce 
crops. Even in Texas, producers have an ability to switch to other commodities 
for production. However, Louisiana sugarcane producers are limited primarily to 
the production of sugarcane given the state’s climate, soil, and other 
environmental factors.  
Louisiana has more than 700 sugarcane producers who use more than 
433,000 acres for production (Champagne). Many of these producers are multi-
generation producers and have accumulated experience and expertise as a result. 
More than 90 percent of the land in production is farmed by share cropping. 
These producers currently produce about 12 million tons of sugarcane to be 
processed by mills that are primarily located in Louisiana. This processing yields 
about 1.26 million tons of raw sugar. Production is highly mechanized, and as a 
result, costs tend to be fixed (land and machinery) rather than variable (labor and 




A sugarcane mill is the first step in processing the sugarcane. Initially 
sugarcane is passed through heavy rollers to extract the juice (Baucum, Rice, and 
Schueneman). The mill adds hot water to the cane and repeats the rolling process 
a few times. Following that, lime is added to the juice to ensure the raw sugar 
remains in the form of sucrose rather than other non-crystallizing forms of sugar. 
Finally, the water is evaporated from the juice, leaving only raw sugar crystals. 
Each one hundred pounds of raw sugar produced from sugarcane also produces 
three gallons of molasses as a byproduct. Although a fair amount of water is used 
in the process, water is actually a byproduct of crushing the cane because it is 
nearly 50 percent water. Therefore, water is not a constraint for sugarcane mills.   
Louisiana has eight sugarcane mills; Florida has five mills. Of the 
sugarcane mills operating in Louisiana, seven of them are members of LSCPI. 
Sugarcane mills operate only for a brief window of time near autumn harvest. 
Because sugarcane contains large amounts of water, importing sugarcane to be 
processed during other parts of the year is cost prohibitive. This segment of the 
industry is also capital intensive, and fixed costs represent a substantial portion of 
total costs. Thus, economies of scale in sugarcane mills are an important 
determinant to their profitability.  
The sugar mills produce two commercially desirable products. Molasses, 




feeds. Raw sugar, on the other hand, is coarse and filled with impurities, which 
requires it to be further refined before being used. Once the mill has processed the 
cane into raw sugar, the product is sold to sugar refineries.  
 
Sugar Refineries 
The sugar refinery transforms raw sugar into the product that is sold to end 
consumers or used as an ingredient in processed foods, baked goods, and 
beverages. The refineries can offer different forms and levels of sugar quality 
depending on the purchaser’s intended use. Refineries offer several levels of 
coarseness of granulated sugar and also offer brown, powdered, and liquid sugar. 
Each offering is best suited for a particular use.  
Raw sugar is purchased primarily by sugar refiners. The U.S. has very few 
buyers of raw sugar (figure 7). Not more than a decade ago, Tate & Lyle PLC 
(previously operating in the U.S. as A.E. Staley) was a dominant force in the 
sugar refining business. Owning more than one-third of the sugar refining 
capacity in the U.S., they controlled a significant portion of the market. In 2001, 
Tate & Lyle sold its North American sugar operations, which included the 
Domino brand, for $180 million. An investment group led by Alfonso and J. Pepe 
Fanjul, who controlled Flo-Sun and Florida Crystals, purchased a controlling 
interest of 61 percent in Domino, and the Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of 
Florida purchased the remaining 39 percent (The New York Times Company).  
In Louisiana only two sugar refineries are in operation (represented by 
pentagons on figure 1). One is the refinery owned by Domino Sugar in Chalmett. 
Imperial Sugar owns the other refinery in Gramercy, which has a refining 
capacity of about 800,000 tons of sugar per year. Domino Sugar and Imperial 
Sugar represent two of the largest consumer sugar brands in the country and have 
significant bargaining power in the sugar marketing chain. Recently, US Sugar 
Corporation built a new 600,000 ton per year refinery in Florida. The total costs 
of building this modern refinery exceeded $100 million.  
 
Sugar Marketers  
The sugar marketers, who often also market other types of sweeteners, are 
an important link between producers and consumers, According to its own 
website, United Sugars Corporation is the largest marketer of industrial and 
consumer sugar in the U.S. They supply more than five billion pounds of refined 
sugar per year, accounting for more than 30 percent of domestic demand. The 
firm markets to both food manufacturers and retailers. The firm strives to meet 
‘preferred supplier’ status with retailers and offers both private-label and branded 
sugar products. A partnership with U.S. Sugar Corporation guarantees supplies of 
cane sugar for United Sugars.  Journal of Cooperatives  8 
 
Cargill is another marketer of sweeteners through its CargillFoods 
division. This division has aimed to be a “food solutions partner,” and strives to 
provide a variety of inputs with the prepared food companies. Cargill is the 
world’s largest privately-held corporation with more than $50 billion in revenues 
according to Family Business Magazine’s ranking of largest family businesses. 
Cargill employs more than 95,000 individuals to buy and sell grain, poultry, beef, 
steel, seeds, salt, and other commodities on six continents. According to the 
company’s website, the Cargill Sweeteners business unit has sales of $2.0 billion, 
including corn sweeteners, sugar, feed, corn oil, ethanol, industrial starch, and 
fermentation feedstock product lines. Employing more than 2,000 individuals, the 
division works with food processors to provide a variety of options for sweetening 
beverages, snacks, and packaged foods. To improve marketing efficiency, food 
processors often rely on Cargill to be the sole supplier of inputs such as sugar. As 
a result, Cargill is seeking to build partnerships to help ensure a consistent supply 
of their own sugar. Cargill Sweeteners has already shown a willingness to partner 
with cooperatives in the past. They have marketing alliances with the Southern 
Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative and Wyoming Sugar Company, LLC. By 
partnering with someone in Louisiana or Florida, Cargill would have an 
opportunity to have a more consistent supply of cane sugar rather than just beet 
sugar.  
Some companies, such as Imperial Sugar, are vertically integrated in that 
they refine and market their own sugar. According to the firm’s annual report, 
products from its Gramercy refinery are marketed using the brands Imperial, 
Holly, and Dixie Crystals. It has private-label brands, however, that account for 
the bulk of its sales (71 percent) to retail customers. Imperial also offers refined 
sugar to food processors in a fashion similar to United Sugars and Cargill.  
 
Sugar Prices 
The NYBOT used to have two pits that traded sugar contracts. A contract 
is for 112,000 lbs. of cane sugar, and futures are traded for the months of January, 
March, May, July, September, and November. Prices are quoted in dollars per 
pound and have a minimum price movement of 1/100 cent/lb. This price is 
equivalent to $11.20 per contract.  
There are two types of contracts: Sugar No. 14 is a contract for domestic 
sugar and Sugar No. 11 is a contract for international sugar. Sugar No. 14 Futures 
are calls for delivery of raw cane sugar in bulk with CIF (cost, insurance, and 
freight) duty paid at ports in New York, NY; Baltimore, MD; Galveston, TX; 
New Orleans, LA; and Savannah, GA. Sugar No. 11 Futures are contract calls for 
delivery of cane sugar, stowed in bulk, FOB (free on board) from any of twenty-




The market for sugar futures is thin with very few contracts traded per 
session. Recently, the open-outcry system in trading pits has been abandoned for 
an electronic system because so few traders exist in the market, and the volume of 
trades is so low. Currently, information about the bids (prices and number of 
contracts buyers are willing to pay), asks (prices and number of contracts 
suppliers are willing to accept), and trades are maintained on the Intercontinental 
Exchange, an electronic trading platform. Historical data from 1985 to 2006 
shows the average trading volume for Sugar No. 14 at just under 500 contracts per 
day, with a median value of 365 contracts per day. Other agricultural commodities 
are traded with much greater volume on the NYBOT including Sugar No. 11 
Futures that are related to international sugar deliveries. In fact, the No. 11 
Futures are the most heavily traded agricultural commodity on the NYBOT, 
averaging more than 44,000 contracts per day in January 2007. Cocoa, cotton, and 
coffee averaged between 8,000 to 12,000 contracts traded per day in January 
2007.  
 
U.S. Government Policies Related to Sugar  
The sugar industry has benefitted recently from some protectionist 
measures to reduce price volatility in the U.S. The key instrument used to limit 
sugar importation is a tariff-rate quota (TRQ). Under the TRQ, some sugar is 
allowed to be imported at a lower, preferential tariff rate equal to 0.625 cents per 
pound (Haley and Ali). After the quota is filled, the tariff rate increases 
dramatically. This higher rate makes it economically infeasible to continue selling 
sugar to the United States. With the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreements, specifically the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, the U.S. 
committed to providing minimum access for 1.256 million tons of raw sugar. The 
Secretary of Agriculture assesses the market situation annually and then 
determines the amount of sugar allowed to be imported under the TRQ. The U.S. 
Trade Representative has the authority to allocate the TRQ to specific countries, 
but currently allocates shares based on the historic shares during the 1975-1981 
period.  
The allocations used to include Mexico, but the Mexican share is now 
determined by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). An 
important note is that the agreements in NAFTA regarding sweeteners were under 
dispute by both countries as a result of a side-letter agreement. Although the 
dispute has played out over the entire life of NAFTA, in a letter to the WTO dated 
July 2006, the countries agreed to eliminate duties and quantitative restraints on 
Mexican sugar shipments to the United States effective January 1, 2008. Mexico 
reciprocated by eliminating trade barriers related to U.S. HFCS shipments to 
Mexico. Journal of Cooperatives  10 
 
Domestically, the U.S. government has also played a role in sugar 
production by virtue of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 
commonly referred to as the 2002 Farm Bill. This piece of legislation used 
nonrecourse loans to sugar processors to ensure that domestic prices are higher 
than world prices. Because the loans are nonrecourse loans, the USDA must 
accept the sugar used for collateral as payment in lieu of cash at the discretion of 
the processor. So if market prices are too low to cover the loan, then the 
government essentially buys and stores the raw sugar as part of the authority of 
the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). This effectively removes sugar from 
the market, which helps to reduce excess supply. The government gives loans to 
processors rather than producers (the case in most other agricultural commodities) 
because the cane must be processed into raw sugar before it can be effectively 
stored. The processors must promise to pass along these price benefits to 
producers to qualify for the program, and controls are in place for the government 
to ensure that this happens.  
The Farm Bill also requires the USDA to operate the program as much as 
possible at no cost to the federal government. As a result, large incentives exist 
for the USDA to ensure that the price is high enough to cover the loan, interest, 
and other costs so that sugar is not forfeited to the CCC. The USDA also has the 
authority to establish flexible marketing allotments to help control the amount of 
sugar produced. Cane sugar receives 45.65 percent of the overall allotment 
quantity (OAQ). The OAQ is established based on the level of consumption, 
imports, and historic production. Contingencies are available during the year for 
reallotment, but no provision is in place for the cane allotment to be reassigned to 
beet sugar. The U.S. government is due to write a new Farm Bill in 2008 that may 
change some of the provisions related to sugar. The likelihood is that alternative 
income support measures might be considered as options in the 2008 Farm Bill 
(Haley and Ali). Those drafting the Bill will surely be sensitive to the change in 
imports due to the elimination of tariffs on sugar from Mexico as a result of 
NAFTA. However, the decisions LSCPI General Manager Lonnie Champagne 

















Figure 1. Louisiana counties with sugar cane production and locations of LSCPI 









































Strategic Options for Vertical Coordination
NOTE: The diagonal line represents the mix of invisible-hand and managed coordination 
characteristics found in each of the five alternative strategies for vertical coordination.  The 
area above the diagonal indicates the relative level of invisible-hand characteristics and the area 
below the diagonal indicates the relative level of managed characteristics










Figure 3. Consumer and Wholesale Prices of Sugar, 1996-2002  
Source: American Sugar Alliance 
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Source:  National Agricultural Statistics Service and Farm Service Agency, USDA









Table 1: Recent mill and refinery closures 
 
Cane Mill Closures     
Ka’u Agibusiness  Hawaii  1996 
Waialua Sugar  Hawaii  1996 
McBryde Sugar  Hawaii  1996 
Breaux Bridge Sugar  Louisiana  1998 
Pioneer Mill Company  Hawaii  1999 
Talisman Sugar Company  Florida  1999 
Amfac Sugar  Kekaha, Hawaii  2000 
Amfac Sugar  Lihue, Hawaii  2000 
Hawaiin Commercial & Sugar  Paia, Hawaii  2000 
Evan Hall Sugar Cooperative  Louisiana  2001 
Caldwell Sugar Cooperative  Louisiana  2001 
Glenwood Sugar Cooperative  Louisiana  2003 
New Iberia Sugar Cooperative  Louisiana  2005 
Jeanerette Sugar Company  Louisiana  2005 
U.S. Sugar*  Bryant, FL  2005 
Cinclare Central Facility*  Louisiana  2005 
Atlantic Sugar**  Belle Glade, FL  2005 
Sugar Refinery Closures     
C&H Aiea,  Hawaii  1996 
Imperial Everglades,  Florida  1999 
Imperial   Sugarland, Texas   2003 
Domino Brooklyn,  New 
York 
2004 
* Phasing out operations 2005-2007 
** Suspended operations for 2005/06 
Note: In 2006, 23 beet factories, 19 raw cane mills, and 8 cane refineries 
remain in continuous operation, a 39% drop since 1996. 
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Introductory Comments and Case Synopsis 
Deciding how best to coordinate activities can be a challenge 
posed in any marketing chain. Given that some agricultural cooperatives 
have traditionally focused exclusively on marketing commodities, a 
decision to link into the chain via processing must be carefully explored 
before the final result is determined. This case involves an agricultural 
cooperative that has focused entirely on marketing raw sugar for 
additional refinement. Recent dramatic shifts in the sector have caused the 
members of the cooperative to consider entering into a joint venture with 
an operation that will process the raw sugar cane. In so doing, the 
cooperative can consider using the spot market, using contracts, vertically 
coordinating, or vertically integrating. Given the wide options available to 
them, this situation makes for a particularly unique case study.  
Students are asked to play the role of general manager of the 
cooperative. Louisiana Sugar Cane Products, Inc. (LSCPI) would like to 
move from being a supplier of a low-value input (raw sugar) to being 
more vertically integrated and capture some value-added revenue. Several 
factors, including a trend of decreased U.S. refining capacity and 
increased U.S. sugar imports resulting from various trade agreements 
(NAFTA and DR-CAFTA), no current business ties to a sugar refinery, 
and a stable, at best, to declining price have raised concerns that LSCPI 
could potentially be squeezed out of much of its domestic market outlets. 
In their role, students will evaluate the alternatives available to them and 
make a decision on how best to coordinate in the marketing chain. 
Students have enough detailed information in this case to make an 
informed decision, though no answer is necessarily correct. This fact is 
reflected in the long and difficult process that it took for LSCPI to make a 
decision and the lengthy effort in which they have invested to complete a 
partnership with Cargill.   
 
Where and When to Use the Case 
This case study investigates the real-life decision for an 
agricultural cooperative regarding its choice to vertically coordinate. With 
options ranging from spot markets to fully vertically integrating, this case 
study offers many options to illustrate the coordination decision. Given its 
real-life nature and relevance to production agriculture, it has broad appeal 
to instructors teaching agricultural marketing. The case would be suitable 
in an introductory course for discussion, or for an intermediate level 
course focused on students presenting a detailed analysis. In addition, 




instructors of courses focusing on the governance and operations of 
cooperatives.  
Enough detail is included in the case so that it can be used as a 
self-contained lesson for discussion in one class period. The case also 
provides the opportunity to challenge students to do additional research 
regarding the options available. The only limitation to this approach is that 
much of the recent outcomes of the decisions are part of publically 
available information, and students might assume that the actual decision 
made is the only correct decision. Undoubtedly students in this situation 
will discover the efforts made with Cargill. This is simply one of several 
options the students can consider and if the information is found, they 
merely have one suggested outcome to consider. They still have other 
options to consider and evidence to offer for their decisions in the case. 
 
Learning Objectives Supported by the Case 
The case study provides instructors the opportunity to achieve the 
following objectives: 
1.  Develop critical thinking skills by challenging students with 
problems that have no easy or obvious solutions 
2.  Expose students to strategies and practices of agricultural 
cooperatives 
3.  Provide students with the underlying motivation and theory of 
managing vertical coordination in a value chain 
 
Options Students Might Consider 
Students must understand that LSCPI is in the business of selling 
raw sugar produced by its owner-members. Production of ethanol, or some 
other option, is considered to be supplementary to the cooperative’s 
current operations. Options should be considered only if they are 
economically feasible and would fit into LSCPI’s current operations. 
Production of cellulosic ethanol would probably not be an option due to 
the current question concerning economic feasibility and also because raw 
sugar mills would not totally convert from producing raw sugar to 
producing some other product. Given these facts, students might consider 
the following options: 
1.  Do Nothing: 
Continued considerable market price risk and the continual 
need to increase efficiency to lower costs in the face of 
relatively stable or declining prices 
2.  Buy Existing Refinery: Journal of Cooperatives  20 
 
Issues to deal with would be the cost to upgrade refinery 
equipment and who would market the refined sugar produced. 
3.  Build Own Refinery: 
Issues to deal with would include who would market the 
refined sugar produced and the risk of the ability to sell raw 
sugar to its current buyer (refinery) until construction of the 
new refinery was completed. 
4.  Joint Venture with Partner: 
Seek a joint venture partner who has something to bring to the 
table, such as refined sugar marketing expertise, existing 
complementary facilities, and market activities 
 
Factors Influencing Options Considered 
1.  Differing Partner Philosophies: 
How to deal with differing partner philosophies on specific 
issues 
For example, LSCPI supports the current sugar farm program 
to support market prices while Cargill generally supports free 
trade without program support. 
2.  SWOT Analysis: 
SWOT Analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) 
was used by both sides.  Both partners continually asked 
themselves the question “Are we doing the right thing?” 
3.  Economic Analysis: 
Extensive economic analysis of the joint venture was 
conducted by both sides over an extended time horizon.   
Eventually, both sides had to agree to use a common economic 
model to be consistent on assumptions, projected revenues, 
expenses, and other factors. 
4.  Partner Education: 
Since both partners were bringing something different to the 
table in this joint venture, there were times when one side had 
to educate the other side on a specific issue or topic. Examples 
would include Cargill explaining a refining sugar marketing 
strategy and LSCPI explaining sugarcane production and 
processing. 
5.  Consultants: 
Both partners used consultants or experts with specific and 
various areas of expertise 
Some of the consultants were company personnel, and others 




represented include sugarcane production, raw sugar 
processing engineering, sugar refining engineering, economic, 
legal, and accounting. 
6.  Information: 
In joint venture negotiations of this magnitude, a critical issue 
was related to information about the joint venture and what and 
when certain information was to be made public, given the 
impact this type of information has on the market and market 
participants. 
7.  Financing: 
Securing the large amount of financing required by this venture 
necessitated the evaluation and defense of the risk of the 
project as well as the probability of economic success.  
8.  Negotiation: 
Finally, the importance of negotiation and the ability and art to 
negotiate successfully in a venture of this type cannot be 
overstated. Important aspects of successful business 
negotiation include having an experienced, knowable lead 
negotiator, having a negotiation team that includes a diversity 
of expertise as well as being able to identify points on which a 
person is willing to agree or concede on and points on which a 
person is not. 
 
Follow-up to the Case 
LSCPI has publicly announced a partnership with Cargill (Cargill). 
Establishing the new refinery in St. John’s the Baptist Parish was delayed 
due to legislative concerns. The partnership was to be funded at least in 
part by Gulf Opportunity Zone bonds that would have provided tax 
incentives for the project. Due to concerns raised by Imperial Sugar 
regarding the sustainability of two sugar refineries in the region, 
legislators “permanently deferred” action on the project in November of 
2007 (Millhollon). In February 2008, the Louisiana State Bond 
Commission decided to move forward with the bonds (Scott). The 
composition of the board had changed with the election of a new 
governor. The new governor, Bobby Jindhal leant his administration’s 
support to the new facility.  
 